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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE OF THE PRESS IN JUVENILE
CASES
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently held, in State
ex rel The Times and Democrat1, that statutory provisions re-
stricting publication of information identifying a juvenile subject
to family court jurisdiction were unconstitutional insofar as they
prevented the truthful publication by the media of information
lawfully obtained concerning a juvenile charged with a crime. Al-
though the court did not expressly invalidate section 14-21-30 of
the South Carolina Code,2 it did conclude that the provisions in
question violated the appellants' first amendment rights.
In State ex rel The Times and Democrat, a reporter for the
Times and Democrat visited a murder scene and photographed
a juvenile in police custody. The reporter's photograph and an
accompanying story were subsequently published by the Times
and Democrat and other media sources. A South Carolina cir-
cuit court found that those media sources which had published
the material were in violation of section 14-21-30 and held them
in contempt. The court also imposed a sanction against the
Times and Democrat, since the trial judge determined that only
its publication had caused prejudice to the juvenile.8
On appeal, the parties cited for contempt contended that
the statute violated their rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution.4 Emphasizing
the youthfulness of the offender, the State argued that preserv-
ing the juvenile's anonymity would promote rehabilitation, and
1. 276 S.C. 26, 274 S.E.2d 910 (1981).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-30 (1976)(repealed May 1981) provided, in pertinent
part: "The name or picture of any child under the jurisdiction of the court shall not be
made public by any newspaper, radio or TV station, except as authorized by order of the
court. . . ." This section was repealed as part of a total reorganization of provisions
dealing with family, domestic, and juvenile matters. The new provision, however, codi-
fied as § 20-7-830, is substantially the same as that declared unconstitutional in State ex
rel The Times and Democrat. 1981 S.C. Acts 170, No. 71.
3. 276 S.C. at 28, 274 S.E.2d at 911.
4. Id. at 27, 274 S.E.2d at 911.
1
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that such purpose constituted sufficient State interest to abridge
the appellants' first amendment right of publication. 5 The South
Carolina Supreme Court did not agree with the State's reason-
ing, however, as it found the relevant statutory provisions un-
constitutional and reversed the contempt citations.
6
The South Carolina Supreme Court first recognized the con-
stitutional rights of the press as a defense to invasion of privacy
charges in Meetze v. Associated Press,' in which it held that
matters of "legitimate public interest" necessarily limited -the
right of privacy.8 Subsequently, a United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina interpreted South Carolina
law as recognizing official action in criminal proceedings as a
matter of general public interest." Nevertheless, section 14-21-30
purported to withhold this privilege in cases concerning
juveniles.
In reaching its decision in State ex reI The Times and
Democrat, the court cited the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co."° for the proposi-
tion that "the State may not punish a newspaper for the publi-
cation of truthful information, lawfully obtained, about a matter
of public significance, except when necessary to further a State
interest of the highest order."'" In Smith, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a West Virginia statute similar to sec-
tion 14-21-30.12 The statute at issue in Smith applied only to
newspapers, 13 however, and Justice Rehnquist suggested that
the outcome of Smith might have been different had the statute
applied uniformly to all media sources. 4 The South Carolina
Supreme Court did not address this distinction in State ex rel
The Times and Democrat, however.
State ex rel The Times and Democrat declared unconstitu-
tional the clause in section 14-21-30 of the South Carolina Code
5. Id. at 28-29, 274 S.E.2d at 911.
6. Id. at 29, 274 S.E.2d at 911.
7. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1957).
8. Id. at 337, 95 S.E.2d at 609.
9. Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (D.S.C. 1959).
10. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
11. 276 S.C. at 28, 274 S.E.2d at 911.
12. 443 U.S. at 105-06.
13. Id. at 104-05.
14. Id. at 107, 110.
[Vol. 34
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that prohibited the publication of the identity of a juvenile sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the family court, a result likely in ac-
cord with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
Although the South Carolina decision leaves the remainder of
the statute intact, it raises questions about the degree of confi-
dentiality that remains in family court proceedings concerning
juveniles.
Danny R. Collins
II. ADULT ADOPTEE'S RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIAL -ADOPTION
RECORDS
The South Carolina Supreme Court made its initial deter-
mination of an adult adoptee's right to confidential adoption
records in Bradey v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina.5 In-
terpreting the controlling South Carolina statute,18 which allows
disclosure of identifying information upon a showing of good
cause, the court held that "good cause" requires a demonstration
of compelling need for the identifying information and that per-
sonal desire, even when accompanied by some emotional insta-
bility, is not sufficiently compelling.17 Although the court dis-
cussed the natural parents' constitutional rights to privacy, it
based its decision on public policy considerations.1 s This deci-
15. 275 S.C. 622, 274 S.E.2d 418 (1981). Litigation over an adoptee's right to infor-
mation about his natural parents has increased dramatically in the last decade. Sympo-
sium on Children and the Law, 12 U.C.D.L. REV. 350 (1979)[hereinafter cited as
Symposium].
The typical case involves an adult adoptee who, for medical or psychological reasons,
desires information from sealed court records. E.g., Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d 618,
393 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div. 1977)(medical reasons); In re Linda F. M., 95 Misc. 2d 581,
409 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (psychological reasons).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-140(c)(1976)(current version at § 20-7-180(c)(Supp.
1981)) states:
All files and records pertaining to the adoption proceedings in the Children's
Bureau in the State of South Carolina, or in the Department of Social Services
of the State of South Carolina, or in any authorized agency, shall be confiden-
tial and withheld from inspection except upon order of court for good cause
shown.
17. 275 S.C. at 629, 274 S.E.2d at 422. Disposition of adoptees' requests for informa-
tion frequently turns on whether the information sought is nonidentifying or identifying.
Nonidentifying information such as medical records or the parents' ethnic background
may be obtained more easily than information that would identify the natural parents.
18. For a further discussion of public policy considerations underlying good cause,
see Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REV. 125, 139
3
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sion places South Carolina in the mainstream of judicial think-
ing on the subject.19
Max Bradey's natural mother placed him for adoption with
the Children's Bureau of South Carolina when he was~an infant.
Although Bradey enjoyed a congenial relationship with his adop-
tive mother,20 he wanted to know the identity of his natural par-
ents. His requests for information from the Children's Bureau
had yielded all of the nonidentifying information in his file,21
but no identifying information could be released without a court
order pursuant to section 15-45-140(c) of the South Carolina
Code. In a petition for an order to release the identifying infor-
mation, Bradey alleged that his unsuccessful search for his par-
ents' identity had caused him "mental anguish and emotional
turmoil. '2 2 The trial court found that his desire to know the
(1982).
19. See, e.g., Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd,
601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); In re Roger B., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E.2d 884 (App. Ct. 1980); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
20. Record at 23. Bradey's adoptive father was deceased at the time of the hearing.
His adoptive mother lived with him at the time of the trial and had consented to his
search for his natural mother.
21. Id. at 35. Only South Carolina and Connecticut have statutes allowing access to
nonidentifying information without a court order. These statutes lead what may become
a trend toward freer disclosure of information. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-140(d)(Supp.
1980)(current version at § 20-7-1780 (Supp. 1981)) provides:
The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent any adoption
agency from furnishing to adoptive parents, biological parents or adoptees non-
identifying information when in the sole discretion of the chief executive of-
ficer of the agency such information would serve the best interests of the per-
sons concerned either during the period of placement or at a subsequent time
nor shall be the provisions of this chapter be construed to prevent giving non-
identifying information to any other person, party or agency who in the discre-
tion of the chief executive officer of the agency has established a sufficient rea-
son justifying the release of that nonidentifying information. As used in this
subsection "nonidentifying information" may include but is not limited to the
following:
1. the health of the biological parents;
2. the health of the child;
3. the child's general family background without name references;
4. the length of time the child has been in the care and custody of the
adoptive parents.
The release of other nonidentifying information shall be made at the dis-
cretion of the chief officer of the adoption agency.
See generally Symposium, supra note 15, at 355-59.
22. Record at 3.
4
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truth and his emotional distress were good cause within the
meaning of section 15-45-140(c) and ordered disclosure of the
information.23
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that
the trial judge, in determining that Bradey had a compelling
need for the identifying information, had given insufficient con-
sideration to the natural parents' right to privacy. The court
found that even though Bradey had a sincere desire to know his
parents' identity and had suffered some emotional insecurity, he
had not demonstrated a compelling need to know his parents'
identity. The court noted the absence of any need for medical
treatment, disruption in employment, or instability in family life
that might have indicated a compelling need.24
The Bradey court reasoned that statutory sealing of adop-
tion records serves all parties to an adoption. Insulating the
newly formed adoptive family meets the needs of adoptees and
adoptive parents. Confidentiality also serves the interests of nat-
ural parents and society by ensuring a fresh start for the natural
parents and providing an incentive for using the state's adoption
process instead of less desirable means. 5 The court held, there-
fore, that any determination of the rights of an adoptee must
also include a consideration of the rights of these other parties.
Although Bradey is consistent with other decisions on
adoptees' rights, 6 the South Carolina Supreme Court did not
fully examine the constitutional issues that are inherent in a
case such as this. On appeal, Bradey raised the issue that deny-
ing adoptees access to their adoption records denied them equal
protection of the law, 2  but because this claim had not been
presented at trial, the court summarily rejected it. 28 In addition,
other adoptees have argued that denial of access to adoption
records abridged their constitutional rights to privacy and access
to information, though Bradey did not argue this.29 The Chil-
dren's Bureau argued that releasing natural parents' names
would violate the parents' substantive due process right to pri-
23. Record at 14.
24. 275 S.C. at 629, 274 S.E.2d at 423.
25. Id. at 626, 274 S.E.2d at 420.
26. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 19.
27. Brief for Respondent at 5.
28. 275 S.C. at 629, 274 S.E.2d at 422.
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vacy.3 0 An analysis of both sides of the due process issue reveals
that neither the natural parents' nor the adoptees' fundamental
rights are violated, regardless of whether adoption records are
closed or open.
Justice Harwell, writing in Bradey for a unanimous court,
relied heavily on the decisions in Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon,31
In re Maples,32 and Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital
Statistics.3 3 In these cases34 adoptees unsuccessfully advanced
two theories in support of their claim that they have a funda-
mental constitutional right to know who their parents are.
The first theory is that sealed-record statutes violate the
adoptees' right to privacy in family matters. 5 However, no court
has yet agreed that constitutional guarantees of personal privacy
encompass a right to self-actualization."
30. Brief for Appellant at 3.
31. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
32. 563 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1978).
33. 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
34. See also Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); In re Roger B., 85 IM. App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E.2d 884 (App.
Ct. 1980); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978); Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d
618, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div. 1977); In re Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d
638 (Sur. Ct. 1978).
35. For detailed discussions of the theories advanced by adoptees, see generally,
Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11
FAM. L.Q. 185 (1977); Levin, The Adoption Trilemma: The Adult Adoptee's Emerging
Search for His Ancestral Identity, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 496 (1979); Symposium, supra
note 15; Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1196 (1975); Note, The Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees to
Know the Identity of Their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677 (1980); Comment,
Breaking the Seal: Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Adult Adoptees' Right
to Identity, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 316 (1980); Comment, Discovery Rights of the
Adoptee-Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN.
FERN. V.L. REV. 65 (1975); Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Exami-
nation, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. at 310,
372 A.2d at 650. One writer has developed a theory of a right to privacy based on the
"blood tie" between parent and child. Though untried, the argument may be persuasive
in future cases. See Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 35, at 327-29.
The right to privacy in matters of marriage and family was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court indicated
that privacy in the marriage relationship is implicitly protected by the penumbras of the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id. at 484-85. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), the Court clarified the parameters of constitutional protection for personal
privacy: "[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' are included in the guarantee of personal privacy." Id. at 152.
Hence citizens have a constitutionally protected right to exercise their fundamental
[Vol. 34
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The second theory is that sealed-record statutes violate the
adoptees' right to receive information.37 The United States Su-
preme Court has recognized a right to receive information as a
corollary of the first amendment guarantee of free speech;38 how-
ever, the right to receive information assumes that information
is available from a willing source.39 The assumption is not valid
as applied to adoptees and their natural parents since natural
parents are usually unwilling to have their identity revealed to
their children,40 and those parents who do desire to meet the
children they placed for adoption have other means available.""
Even if adoptees could succeed in demonstrating a fundamental
right to identifying information about their natural parents, that
right would still not be absolute, since even fundamental rights
must yield to a compelling state interest. 12 Courts considering
the question have generally justified keeping adoption records
sealed because of the state's interests in protecting the privacy
of the natural parents and preserving the adoption process.4
The natural parents have two separate rights to privacy to
be protected in these cases. They have the right to be free from
government intrusion and the right to be free from intrusion by
individuals. For the proposition that parents have a fundamen-
tal right to be free from governmental intrusions into their pri-
rights free from governmental intrusion. This guarantee, to the extent that it is derived
from the Bill of Rights, is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
and is also found in that amendment's concept of personal liberty. Courts have recog-
nized constitutional protection from governmental intrusion only in the most intimate
areas of marital and personal privacy. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. at 310, 372 A.2d at 650. Adoptees argue that denying them
information about their natural parents prevents them from becoming whole persons.
See, e.g., Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1231. The adoptees' contentions are
supported by recent psychiatric research such as Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects
of the Sealed Record in Adoption, 133 AM. J. PsycH. 900 (1976).
37. See supra note 35.
38. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Gotkin v. Miller,
379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
40. See Klibanoff, supra note 35 at 195; Note, Current Status of the Right of Adult
Adoptees, supra note 35, at 682-83. But see, Symposium, supra note 15, at 353.
41. Organizations such as the Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association (ALMA)
and Yesterday's Children offer adoptees assistance in locating their natural parents.
42. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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vacy, courts have uniformly cited Stanley v. Georgia.44 The par-
ents' right to be free from intrusions by individuals is similar to
the right to be free from governmental intrusions, but the gen-
eral right to privacy is protected by state statutes and public
policy, not by the Constitution.45
Besides having an interest in preserving the natural parents'
right to privacy, the State has a public policy interest in preserv-
ing confidentiality in the adoption process. Many of the children
given up for adoption are illegitimate, 4  and society's strong dis-
approval of illegitimacy encourages statutory sealing of adoption
records to protect the innocent children. In addition, parents
of illegitimate children generally desire anonymity, and the
state's adoption process provides it.48 If the adoption process
were not confidential, parents of illegitimate children might use
less desirable means to give them up, and the children could suf-
fer because of it. 9 The state's interest in preserving the adop-
tion process is a strong one, benefitting both natural parents and
adoptees. Some courts have found this state interest to be
compelling.50
Competing with the state's interest in preserving the adop-
tion process and protecting the natural parents right to privacy
44. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). In Stanley, the Court made it clear that the privacy
right it recognized applied to governmental intrusions: "[Also fundamental is the right
to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy" and (quoting Brandeis, J. dissenting in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)) " '[t]he makers of the Constitution ... conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.'" The South Carolina Supreme Court's failure to
distinguish between the constitutionally protected right to privacy and the general right
to privacy protected by the states may be attributable in part to appellant counsel's
misquotation of Stanley in his brief: "In Stanley, the Court put forth the view that the
makers of the Constitution, in order to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of hap-
piness, conferred upon the American people, 'the right to be let alone-and it guarantees
a person's general rights to privacy and freedom from unwarranted intrusions.'" Brief
for Appellant at 3.
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
46. Levin, supra note 35, at 502.
47. Klibanoff, supra note 35, at 188.
48. See Id. at 195; Note, Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees, supra note
35, at 682-83.
49. For a detailed description of "black market" adoption see L. McTAGGART, THE
BABY BROKERS: THE MARKETING OF WHITE BABIES IN AMERICA (1980).
50. Alma Society Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. at 917 (compelling interest); aff'd, 601
F.2d at 1234 (important interest); Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J.
Super. at 316, 372 A.2d at 653 (compelling interest).
[Vol. 34
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is its interest in the physical and psychological health of the pe-
titioning adoptee. For reasons related to his health or welfare, an
adoptee may have a serious need to know his natural parents'
identity.5 1 It is because of this potential need that many legisla-
tures, including South Carolina's, have written sealed records
statutes to allow release of information if an adoptee shows good
cause.52 These statutes attempt to balance the competing poli-
cies by requiring an adoptee to demonstrate a compelling need
for identifying information before the state's interest in his wel-
fare will outweigh the combined interests in protecting the natu-
ral parents' privacy and preserving the adoption process.5 3 While
this standard is not unwarranted, neither is it mandated by the
Constitution.
The point at which the state's interest in the health of the
adoptee outweighs its interests in protecting the natural parents'
privacy and preserving the adoption process depends upon the
court's ability to determine the effects on the adoptee of not
learning his parents' identity and the effects on his parents and
society of disclosing it. Available information indicates that the
South Carolina Supreme Court has wisely set a high standard
for adoptees to meet before adoption agencies may disclose iden-
tifying information. Nevertheless, as psychological techniques
for measuring the effect on adoptees of not knowing their origins
become more sophisticated and as society's attitude toward ille-
gitimacy becomes more tolerant, the balance may shift in favor
of disclosure.5
III. FREE ExPRESSION AND PARADE PERMIT ORDINANCES
In City of Chester v. Addison and City of Chester v. Al-
len, 5 6 the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the appel-
lants' convictions for violating an allegedly unconstitutional
51. See Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 35, at 316.
52. Symposium, supra note 15, at 355-56; Note, The Current Status of the Right of
Adult Adoptees, supra note 35, at 684; Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records,
supra note 35, at 821.
53. 275 S.C. at 627, 274 S.E.2d at 420-21.
54. For a similar ruling, see, e.g., In re Maples, 565 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
55. See Levin, supra note 35, at 516.
56. - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 579 (1981). Addison was one of thirty-five appellants
who were tried together. Allen was tried separately but the court consolidated the two
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parade permit ordinance.57 In its first review of such an ordi-
nance in nearly twenty years,58 the court affirmed the appellants'
convictions, holding that the ordinance was constitutional on its
face and as applied.59 Although this holding is consistent with an
earlier decision, the court did not consider the implications of
the recent United States Supreme Court free speech decisions.
During the last half of 1979, the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference (SCLC) and the Chester Movement for Justice
obtained parade permits 0 and conducted several marches in the
City of Chester. These marches were in protest of the alleged
failure of Chester County officials to fully investigate the death
of a young black resident. 1 Although the marches were peace-
ful,6 2 Chester residents were outraged 3 when members of the
Communist Party participated in the third march organized by
57. CHESTER, S.C., CODE §§ 27-201 to -203 (1962) provide:
§ 27-201. Permit required to stage parade; exceptions.
It shall be unlawful for any person or organization to stage a parade
or procession on any of the streets in any other public places within the
City without first having applied for and secured a special permit from
the Council to do so, excepting funeral processions, the armed forces of
the U.S. Army or Navy, the military forces of this State and the force of
the police and fire departments of the City.
Ord. 1-8-62.
§ 27-202. Application for permit; insurance of permit.
Such application shall contain the following information:
(1) The time of such proposed parade or procession,
(2) The streets to be used,
(3) The number of persons or vehicles to be engaged, and
(4) The purpose of such parade or procession.
Upon receipt of such application, the Mayor or Council shall, in his
or its discretion, issue a permit subject to the public convenience and
public welfare.
Ord. 1-8-62.
§ 27-203. Penalties to violate §§ 27-201 and 27-202.
Anyone violating the provisions of §§ 27-201 and 27-202 shall upon
conviction be imprisoned for a period not to exceed thirty days or fined
in an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars.
Ord. 1-8-62.
58. See City of Florence v. George, 241 S.C. 77, 127 S.E.2d 210 (1962); City of Dar-
lington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 (1961).
59. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 580.
60. Record at 1, Allen.
61. Brief for Appellant at 3, Allen.
62. Record at 17, Allen.
63. Record at 68, Addison.
10
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SCLC Field Secretary Golden Frinks6 After the march, Chester
Mayor James Funderburk issued a statement to the local news-
paper saying that the Chester City Council would consider per-
mit requests by Chester citizens, but that there would be "'no
more permits issued where Golden Frinks or the Communist
Party is allowed to be involved.' "65
Golden Frinks subsequently applied for a permit to hold a
parade on November 11, 1979.6 The parade was to end at the
County Courthouse. On November 10, 1979, the City Council
voted to deny the permit to avoid a conflict 7 with a Veteran's
Day assembly scheduled near the courthouse68 on the same day.
When the marchers entered Chester on November 11, 1979, they
were arrested for parading without a permit. 9 Their subsequent
convictions in the City of Chester Recorder's Court were af-
firmed on appeal by the trial court and the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, both courts finding that the Chester parade permit
ordinance was constitutional on its face and as applied. 0
In finding the Chester ordinance constitutional on its face,
the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the ordi-
nance was virtually identical to one previously upheld in City of
Darlington v. Stanley."1 In Stanley, the court held that an ordi-
nance does not grant unlimited discretion to a public body when
the standards to be applied are "obvious from the purpose of the
ordinance" and the complexity of the activity to be regulated
makes it impractical to develop a comprehensive regulation.72
The supreme court found that the Darlington statute contained
an inherent limitation requiring the City Council to issue parade
permits based on the "safety, comfort, and convenience of per-
64. Record at 1, Allen.
65. Record at 68, Addison.
66. Id. at 69.
67. The trial court's finding that the permit was denied to avoid having two groups
meet at the same time and place, Record at 150, Allen, was supported by the record. Id.
at 57-58. Nevertheless, the evidence also supports the view that the permit was denied
because of the potential for a physical conflict between the two groups. See Id. at 17, 57,
147.
68. Although the trial court found that the Veteran's Day assembly was "in the path
of the proposed march," Record at 151, Allen, the record indicates that the assembly was
to be held inside the Memorial Building adjacent to the courthouse. Id. at 62.
69. Id. at 71.
70. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 580.
71. 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 (1961).
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sons using the streets. s73 The court applied the same construc-
tion to the Chester ordinance, distinguishing it from the ordi-
nance which the United States Supreme Court found
unconstitutional in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham.7' The
Birmingham ordinance was invalid because it allowed public of-
ficials to deny parade permits based on their own opinions of
"decency," "good order," or "morals." The Chester ordinance
was deemed not as broad and, therefore, was held to be constitu-
tional as written. 5
The court further held that the Chester ordinance was con-
stitutionally applied because the reason stated for denying the
permit for the November 11 parade was to avoid a conflict with
a previously scheduled assembly near the courthouse. This find-
ing was strengthened by the fact that the same groups were sub-
sequently issued a permit for a parade on December 1, 1979.70
The supreme court thus concluded that the denial of a parade
permit had not infringed upon the constitutional rights of appel-
lants and affirmed their convictions.
Because denying the parade permit in Addison and Allen
was an official action that prevented free expression from occur-
ring, it was a form of prior restraint.7 Although prior restraint is
justifiable in some instances, the United States Supreme Court
has held that any system of prior restraint is presumed to vio-
late the first amendment.7 8 Recent cases suggest that a regula-
tory scheme that imposes prior restraint on free expression is
unconstitutional on its face unless it contains substantive stan-
dards for limiting the regulatory body's discretion and procedu-
ral safeguards for insuring prompt judicial review of the regula-
tory body's decision.7
The substantive standards in the Chester ordinance were
satisfied by the court's construction of the ordinance. This con-
struction interpreted the local authorities' discretion as being
73. Id..
74. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
75. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 580.
76. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 580.
77. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTMMP. PROBS. 648
(1955).
78. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
79. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1974); Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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limited to insuring the safety, comfort and convenience of those
on city streets. The court concluded that the ordinance did not
enable the authorities to censor the content of the marchers'
words or signs.8 0
The South Carolina Supreme Court did not consider, how-
ever, whether the Chester ordinance contained procedural safe-
guards. Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet
invalidated a parade permit regulation for failing to incorporate
necessary procedural safeguards, Southeastern Promotions Ltd.
v. Conrad81 indicates that such safeguards must be present in
any system of prior restraint that might deny persons access to a
public forum.82 Further, the Court's opinion in Freedman v. Ma-
ryland83 enumerated the procedural safeguards that a statute or
ordinance must contain: the burden of initiating judicial pro-
ceedings must rest on the body that imposes the prior restraint;
prior restraints may be imposed only during the brief period
before a hearing can be held; and a final decision must promptly
be reached." No such safeguards accompanied the Chester ordi-
nance. While both Southeastern Promotions and Freedman
were obscenity cases and, therefore, concerned with "pure
speech," Shuttlesworth suggests that some form of procedural
safeguards may also be required in regulating picketing or
marching. This is true even though picketing and marching do
not constitute pure speech.85
Although it is a form of prior restraint, a parade permit Ii-
censing scheme has been held constitutional if licenses are
granted or denied according to neutral time, place, and manner
criteria.8 6 The City Council's decision to avoid traffic problems
80. - S.C. at., 284 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. at 147,
122 S.E.2d at 211.
81. 420 U.S. 546 (1974).
82. Accord, Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 273 (1981); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 294 U.S. at 162-64 (1968)(Harlan, J., concurring); Fernadez v. Limmer, 663
F.2d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1981); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 756 (7th Cir.
1972); LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 948 (5th Cir. 1970); vacated on other grounds,
446 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1971); Marco Lounge Inc. v. City of Fed. Heights, - Colo. ,
625 P.2d 982 (1981). See Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. Rzv.
1482 (1970); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. Rav. 518 (1970);
Wexler, Dissent, The Streets and Permits: Chicago as Microcosm, 2 URn. L. 350 (1970).
83. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
84. Id. at 58-59.
85. 394 U.S. 147, 152, 155 n.4.
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that might have occurred had the marchers met the Veteran's
Day assemblage at the courthouse was apparently considered a
valid restriction on the time, place, and manner of appellants'
speech.
7
Appellants' argument in Addison and Allen that the
mayor's statement indicated the City Council's discriminatory
intent was based on Shuttlesworth, in which the United States
Supreme Court ruled that discriminatory statements made by
Birmingham's Commissioner of Public Safety when denying
parade permits indicated that both he and the City Council held
an overly broad view of their powers under Birmingham's
parade ordinance.88 Because the Birmingham ordinance con-
tained no language limiting the authorities' discretion and be-
cause their official words and actions gave no indication that
they administered the ordinance according to the narrow con-
struction subsequently adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was unconstitution-
ally applied. 9 Unlike the Commissioner's statements in Shut-
tlesworth, Mayor Funderburk's statements were not official re-
sponses to permit requests and did not express the City
Council's view of its powers under the Chester ordinance. Conse-
quently, discriminatory intent of the City Council, the body that
actually denied the permit request, was not inferred from the
Mayor's statements.
In holding that the Chester ordinance, as narrowly con-
strued, was constitutional on its face and as applied, the South
Carolina Supreme Court was not called upon in Addison or Al-
len to consider whether the ordinance contained proper proce-
dural safeguards. Consideration of this issue may not have
changed the results in these cases. However, had appellants vig-
orously asserted that the Chester ordinance lacked the procedu-
ral safeguards required by recent United States Supreme Court
87. See supra note 67. Although it is clear that one's right to free speech cannot be
curtailed solely because of the possibility that onlookers may react violently, see Becker-
man v. City of Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1981)(collecting cases); Blasi supra note 82,
it appears that speech may be regulated when the purpose of avoiding possible violence
is coupled with an otherwise valid time, place, or manner restriction.
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decisions, their chances of having the ordinance declared uncon-
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